The aim of this paper is to develop a potential relation between Pyrrhonism and existentialism. This is possible by establishing either an existentialist reconstruction of Pyrrhonism or a Pyrrhonian reconstruction of existentialism. The necessity of unveiling such a relation derives from: (1) the lack of an epistemological sceptical perspective and a normative ethical position within existentialism; (2) the lack of an accurate analysis of the human being within Pyrrhonism. However, the compatibility of the strong aspects inherent in both schools, the sceptical subjectivist arguments and the normative approach to morality inherent in Pyrrhonism and the analysis of the human being in relation to anxiety, potentiality, becoming, alienation, inauthenticity, authenticity and freedom inherent in existentialism, may show us a new way of looking into the universe and human life.
When we analyze Pyrrhonian scepticism as expressed in the texts of Sextus Empiricus,
particularly in his Outlines of Pyrrhonism and Against the Mathematicians (consisting of
Against the Logicians, Against the Physicists and Against the Ethicists), we see an abolishment of the duality between appearance and reality, in the sense that the only thing one can be certain of are appearances (phainomena). The sceptic has no doubt about the appearances but only a doubt about a so called reality; or rather a doubt about how things are in themselves; how things are by nature, independent of the human mind.
1 So the Pyrrhonian sceptic suspends judgement (epoche) both as to whether things are as they appear to us and as to whether things are not as they appear to us.
Appearances in Sextus's texts can both be about sensation and about thought. In other words things appear to our sense perceptions and to our thought and what appears to our sense perceptions and to our thought may differ among different human beings. Appearances are relative. 2 However this does not mean that the Pyrrhonian sceptic raises doubt about the appearance itself. On the contrary, he gives assent to things, he grants things, he raises no doubt about things, as long as they are in accordance with the appearances. Therefore, when the Pyrrhonian sceptic talks about uttering things without belief (adoxastos), he talks about specific beliefs, not all beliefs, he talks about dogmatic beliefs which transcend the appearances and the limits of the human mind; when the Pyrrhonian sceptic talks about suspending judgement, he talks about specific judgements, not all judgements, he talks about dogmatic judgements which transcend the appearances and the limits of the human mind.
To categorize the statement "X is Y in itself, by nature" as one representative of belief and judgement; and to categorize the statement "X appears Y" not as one representative of belief and judgement is obviously absurd. These two statements differ in structure but both statements represent a belief and a judgement. There is no reason to disqualify a statement about an appearance as representative of belief and judgement. 3 The English terms belief and judgement simply do not correspond to the Greek term doxa in the context of Sextus's texts.
For example, the sceptic does not raise any doubt about the fact that honey appears sweet to a particular person if it does so; however he would raise a doubt about whether honey is sweet in itself, by nature. (Scepticism, pg. 15.) . Mates also mentions a counter position to his own saying that the English term belief may have different meanings and that doxa refers to something more specific about the external world but in the end he insists on translating adoxastos as "without belief" (The Sceptic Way, pg. 60). Williams raises the possibility of a similar objection saying that according to some passages in Sextus the scope of epoche might be seen as limited but in the end concludes that Sextus' scepticism is devoid of a theoretical basis in epistemology (Scepticism, pg. 56). Annas does say that the Pyrrhonian sceptic way is compatible with action according to appearances (Hume and Ancient Scepticism, pg. 275 ) and that doxa is more tied to truth and rational support (Hume and Ancient Scepticism, pg. 283) . However this is in contradiction to what she says in the same article when she claims that the Pyrrhonian sceptic has no position, no position of his own and makes no assertion (Hume and Ancient Scepticism, pg. 273, The only way to solve this problem of relativity and establish something in the name of reality would be to establish a criterion of truth, which through a proof would enable us to distinguish between true and false and make a selection from the varying relative appearances. However due to the problems of circularity and infinite regress that does not seem possible as well. 5 To justify a proof with a criterion and a criterion with a proof will lead us into a circular reasoning. To justify a criterion with another criterion or a proof with another proof will lead us into an infinite regress; because each criterion or each proof would itself be in need of a criterion or proof. Basic self-evident assumptions which are immune from a criterion or proof do not seem possible either; if such assumptions would be the case there would not be a relativity among appearances in sensation and thought.
Therefore one must suspend judgement as to anything which goes beyond our appearances, which transcend our appearances. Philosophers who try to establish a realm, a dimension, a world beyond appearance are dogmatist philosophers. The claim of the Pyrrhonian sceptics is not a dogmatist claim because it is satisfied with mere appearances and raises doubt about so called realities. The Pyrrhonian thesis is also not self refuting because the sceptic arguments are only an expression of the sceptic mind; they do not have a claim for objectivity and truth; the arguments are only representative of what appears at the moment to the sceptic mind. The Pyrrhonian thesis has a subjective character. to that belief so intensely that he will be in a fear of losing this belief; if one intensely pursues to hold a belief as to what is good and bad by nature, as to what is objectively and/or universally good and bad because he believes that there is such a thing but is not convinced that he holds such a belief, he will be frustrated and dissappointed and will also think that he is tormented by things that are by nature bad. In any case his soul will be in a state of disturbance and trouble (tarache), not in a state of tranquility. But the sceptic who suspends judgement will only experience certain minor unavoidable troubles such as thirst and hunger and even regarding such unavoidable troubles he will escape them more mildly because he Sartre who uses the term existentialism to describe his ontology. However there are particular similarities and intersecting points among these philosophers which may enable us to use the term existentialism to describe a particular perspective derived from their ideas. 9 When I say existentialism in this paper, I do not refer to the theories of these philosophers as a whole.
Besides significant differences, the essential common points among these philosophers can be summarized as follows: 
1)
The prior task of philosophy should be to present an analysis of the being of the human being.
2) Subjectivity is the essential characteristic of the human being; the human being can not be understood as a whole in purely objective terms.
3) The human being is always in a state of becoming, a potentiality, through choice and action, not in a state of being as a fixed, stable, changeless creature.
4) The feeling of anxiety and/or anguish and/or metaphysical fear and/or spiritual pain is an essential aspect of the human being.
5) Alienation and inauthenticity are as much part of life as authenticity.
These are also the main and basic principles of what I call existentialism and they need not to be identified with other definitions of existentialism. The first and second points do not pose a serious threat to Pyrrhonism; they are even compatible with it. But the third, fourth and fifth points stand as something incompatible with the Pyrrhonian view on the tranquility of the soul as the goal of life and as the consequence of the suspense of judgement on moral issues. These latter points obviously are also not compatible with any type of eudaimonism and/or hedonism in Ancient Greek philosophy; existentialism is not only a threat to Pyrrhonism but also a threat to Plato, Aristotle, Zeno (of Citium) and Epicurus. (I believe the first and second points, depending on our interpretation, may also pose a challenge to these philosophers.)
One may make a distinction between is and ought and say that the goal in Ancient relationship between being-towards-death (sein-zum-tode) and anxiety (angst). Furthermore the existentialists distinguish between fear and anxiety; they say, anxiety, unlike fear, has no object; one can fear something but not feel anxiety about something concrete and particular; the Pyrrhonians on the other hand, like the Epicureans, seem to include the feeling of fear within a troubled and disturbed state of the soul. But eventually we may easily say that the existentialist terms anxiety and anguish do not represent a tranquil state of the soul either; they do represent some sort of disturbance and trouble even if not related to other feelings which can also be categorized under a troubled and disturbed state of the soul. Finally, alienation, both in the sense of losing authenticity and in the sense of losing freedom or the consciousness of freedom is another part of the human condition. It is debatable whether a person can be considered to be happy or to feel pleasure or to be tranquil when he is in a state of alienation and inauthenticity. How can a person be happy or feel pleasure or be tranquil if he is detached from himself, from his distinctive individual characteristics, if he loses his identity in public, in the masses, in the others, if he escapes from his freedom, if he becomes anonymous, mediocre and ordinary, if he can not create his own values?
One objection may be that the Pyrrhonians as well as the Ancient Greek philosophers in general did not have to deal with such concepts as anxiety, anguish, alienation and authenticity; simply because they never experienced such states in their soul; that such feelings are only part of the modern man and the modern world. I have strong doubts about this view. It is correct that such terms and themes became more a part of the philosophical scene in the 19th and 20th centuries; but that does not mean that those feelings and states of the soul never existed before among human beings. It is highly possible that they did exist in Ancient Greece as well; that the same human conditions were present at that time as well; that the obsessive search for happiness, pleasure and tranquility was probably a consciouss or unconsciouss consequence of the presence of those conditions as well.
Based on the same reasons, establishing a goal towards happiness, pleasure and tranquility should not be seen as a surprise; but again, the question is, how natural, how realistic would such an attempt be? If such attempts are incompatible with human nature, wouldn't it be more disappointing for a human being to set such a goal and never achieve it?
How happy and how tranquil can a person be if he sets a goal which is unattainable, which is against human nature, against the natural human condition? The struggle to overcome alienation and inauthenticity is obviously among the most admirable and honourable things in the history of humanity and this struggle should obviously be preserved as long as humanity exists; but the obsession to transcend our fears, pains and anxieties is not only artificial and unnatural but is also against the spirit of a struggle to overcome alienation and inauthenticity.
Fear, pain and anxiety is an essential part of this struggle, the person who has a concern for freedom must necessarily be in a state of fear, pain and anxiety, at least occasionally or frequently, if not on a continious basis.
Another crucial aspect is the effect of the sceptical epistemic condition on the human soul and his psychological state. Not being able to know what is going on out there in the external world at an objective and/or universal level, on the contrary only being aware and consciouss of our appearances, may cause more anxiety and anguish than tranquility or peace of the soul. Not being able to know how things are in themselves independent of the mind, not being able to know what is morally good and bad independent of our personal subjective convictions, not being able to know the future due to the problem of induction, not being able to know whether there is a God or not 12 can terrify most people and make them more anxious.
How can ambiguity and uncertainty be a source of tranquility? Why should it be? Why tranquility? Why not anxiety?
One alternative is to defeat the sceptical arguments stated by the Pyrrhonians. As a matter of fact many philosophers made that attempt. But how successfull have they been?
Isn't that artificial as well? Aristotle stated in his work titled Metaphysics that all human beings have a natural tendency to understand, to know; but the Pyrrhonian arguments shows us that understanding and knowing has its limits as well; that one can not transcend his appearances. (If both Aristotle and the Pyrrhonians are correct in this particular point, the result can be considered as the tragedy of the human being). The 18th century philosopher David Hume was one of the few philosophers who saw and accepted the force of the Pyrrhonian arguments. He thought that only passion, natural instinct and the feeling of belief can save us from the force of Pyrrhonian arguments; the struggle against Pyrrhonian epistemology and ethics through pure reason and rational argumentation, as it has been the case with most rationalist philosophers, is a lost battle. 13 Nietzsche was also one of the few philosophers to agree with scepticism in general and also with Pyrrhonian scepticism in particular; particularly with its challenge against the artificial duality created between appearance and reality, with its arguments against a criterion of truth; declaring Pyrrho as the only original philosopher after the Pre-Socratics to protest against the doctrines of Plato;
declaring the Ancient Sceptics as the only honourable type in the history of philosophy. An existential analysis of the human being shows us that the human being is a being which chooses and acts. As the famous existentialist saying goes, existence preceeds essence;
there is no fixed human nature; man defines himself with his acts and choices; man is condemned to freedom; he is always in a state of choice with an intention and a project towards the future. 15 That is correct but it is also clear that existentialism generally lacks a morality, an ethics with a normative aspect, an ethics with a goal. Existentialism does not only lack an epistemology but usually also a normative ethics, at least in particular major works inauthenticity is rarely presented as a moral goal. Pyrrhonism has a moral goal, namely the tranquility of the soul, but it is a weak and fake goal; existentialism usually has no goal at all, at least not in early Heidegger and Sartre, it is just worried with a descriptive aspect, with the is, not with the ought. Therefore, an existentialist reconstruction of Pyrrhonism or a Pyrrhonian reconstruction of existentialism or if we may say so a synthesis between existentialism and Pyrrhonism also needs the establishment of a moral goal. This goal is neither happiness nor unhappiness, neither pleasure nor pain, neither tranquility nor disturbance. The goal is simply freedom in the sense of overcoming alienation and inauthenticity. As Sartre says, man is condemned to freedom in the sense that he is always in a state of choice with an intention and a projection towards the future; but that is not enough to explain freedom in another sense; the choice needs to be an authentic and non-alienated choice, not just any choice. To supplement this with an aspect in Nietzsche, who is actually not a nihilist as many scholars assume, the goal is freedom in the framework of a worldly, life affirming spirit, with an ability to create our own personal values, without any need to invent universalistic and/or objectivistic moral truths, without any need to invent metaphysical and/or religious other worlds, without any need to invent a life beyond this life we are living in; without negating life; this life being a life of happiness and unhappiness, pleasure and pain, tranquility and disturbance. 16 The existence of all these conditions is a precondition for the possibility of a struggle for freedom. The quest for freedom is necessary because of our awareness of unhappiness, pain and disturbance due to the occasional existence of their opposites; or vice versa, the quest for freedom is necessary because of our awareness of happiness, pleasure and tranquility due to the occasional existence of their opposites. Whether freedom does produce happiness, pleasure or tranquility is not relevant at this stage and one may never know if it will produce happiness, pleasure or tranquility in each person.
